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Whose Revolution Was It? Stalinism
and the Stasi in the Former GDR
Marc Silberman
University of Wisconsin, Madison

even imagine anything other than real existing capitalism as
the goal of human development. Those who do insist on
alternatives are branded as Utopians or as Stalinists in
disguise, a distinction which some would no longer even
allow.
During the last three months of 1991 I have been living in
Berlin with the express interest of observing closely the
consequences of what it means to have lost the collective
project of socialism, particularly among intellectuals and
artists. In what follows I will try to provide an initial
description of what I perceive as some of the coordinates and
constraints in the discussion that is just getting underway. In

The collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe
has led to a situation full of ambiguities. At last it seems to be
possible to talk openly, to name the mechanisms of social
control, to document injustice and state criminality. At the
same time, the political and economic insecurities resulting
from the disintegration of familiar social structures have
narrowed the public's tolerance of alternatives to the ideology of market consumerism and Western parliamentary
democracy. It has become practically impossible to assert or
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particular, I will touch on the implications of the increasingly
inflationary use of the word "Stalinism" and the fetishization
of the Stasi to erase forty years of intellectual and cultural life
in the GDR. These two aspects strike me as especially
pertinent because they suggest a fatal pattern for the process
of constructing the historical memory of the GDR after its
demise. The continuity in the perception of victimization
connects the defeat of 1945 and the collapse of 1989 and
beyond: victims of Hitler and National Socialism, hostages of
the Socialist Unity Party and the Stasi, duped and deceived
now by the promises of unification. Here the need to
remember (and to forget) the GDR might well replicate
mistakes that are all too familiar in the recent German tradition
of historical cognition.

tury notions of redemption fed into Stalinism's traditional
hierarchical structures and management of human needs
should not be ignored.
Another consequence of defining the GDR as a Stalinist
regime is the tendency to move one step further by focusing
on Stalinist crimes and their victims as an historical injustice
that cries out for moral censure and financial reparations.
The comparison to Nazi crimes against humanity is obvious
and has been invoked with regularity. Jürgen Fuchs's
reference in a Spiegel article to the "Holocaust in der Seele"
in the wake of Stasi revelations, and the comparison in a
newspaper of a former Stasi employee turned informer to
Serge Klarsfeld and Simon Wiesenthal are only two examples, but typical ones. The implications of such comparisons are more than problematic and may be illustrated most
succinctly in the discussions surrounding the memorial at the
Buchenwald concentration camp outside Weimar. Established early in the GDR as a major site for documenting the
fascist crimes against humanity, the impressive memorial
(with a museum, a large staff, a famous commemorative
sculpture by Fritz Cremer, etc.) typified the official historical
interpretation of National Socialism as a fascist regime
installed by a conspiratorial elite with the support of
industrial capital. In this version, the victims were Communist Party members—THE antifascist resistance—who suffered and were vindicated in the triumphant victory of a
socialist Germany, the GDR. For years there had been
international criticism of this historical distortion which left
the Holocaust, i.e. the genocide against the European Jews,
practically unmentioned as well as the systematic killing of
members of other resistance and oppositional movements,
of homosexuals, gypsies, and other discriminated groups.
This revision, which was quickly undertaken and proceeds
still now after the collapse of the GDR, has been displaced
by another controversy, however, for it soon came to public
attention that after 1945 Buchenwald continued until 1949 to
function as an internment camp under the administration of
the Soviet Military Authority. Witnesses have begun to
document how political prisoners (mainly former Nazis, but
also critical communists and social democrats) were interned
and often died in the camp owing to the harsh conditions.
The result is a symmetry established between the Nazi
concentration camp and the Stalinist internment camp
(sometimes understood as the entire GDR), while the role of
victim and victimizer is reversed. Heirs to the silent but
willing majority of the Third Reich now feel justified in
demanding recognition and restitution for suffering at the
hands of communist oppressors. If nothing else, such an
historical twist reveals the limits to binary thinking, but also
the inability to differentiate accidental but justified punishment from arbitrary injustice. The "new" victims are caught
in the old GDR categories of martyrs and heroes, and the line
between innocence and responsibility disappears.

Stalinism has become a kind of universal explanation for
the functioning of the GDR state with its centralized apparatus,
endemic opportunism, authoritarian oppression and infiltration of the opposition. Yet such a general understanding of the
phenomenon of Stalinism elides its historical specificity as
well as its political consequences. Stalinism refers, first, to a
series of tactics employed by Stalin to consolidate power in the
national context of the Soviet Union (e.g. the Moscow trials
and the reign of terror in the thirties, the Hitler-Stalin pact in
1939 to postpone war, and the formation of the Eastern Bloc
at the Yalta Conference) and, second, it refers after Stalin's
death to Soviet hegemonic claims through bloody interventions in popular revolts in the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. In this context Stalinism describes a dictatorial system where power is exercised through a single party,
where the state and its organs (justice, military, secret service)
are instrumentalized for the party, and where the public
sphere is functionalized for ideological uniformity and unity
behind the party. Of course, this definition is synonymous
with totalitarianism, and the social sciences have provided an
entire taxonomy of categories and concepts that may be
applied to right as well as left dictatorships. Moreover, some
manifestations of totalitarian systems, such as bureaucratization, apathy and a sense of political blockage, even seem to
be shared with advanced capitalist societies.
I am unsatisfied with this broad definition of Stalinism as a
centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian system for two
reasons. The GDR's very instability, that is, its inability to
totalize control that manifested itself in the collapse of 1989,
would seem to demonstrate how notions of power and
domination must be understood in a complex way. Specifically, the GDR was not as totalitarian as the Soviet Union was
in the 1930s and 1940s, when it faced economic isolation and
physical threat from Nazi Germany. To be sure, the purges and
show trials in the fifties, the cultural freeze introduced at the
Eleventh Plenary in 1965, the silencing of critical intellectuals
around the Biermann expatriation in 1976 all employed
typical Stalinist procedures to pressure the critical opposition
in the GDR: forced admissions through fear or opportunism,
manipulation of laws to serve "higher" state needs, the sowing
of distrust among friends and colleagues, ritualistic arrests and
trials, and prison sentences or expulsion. Yet, to avoid the
summary dismissal of the GDR by those who would only
allow a moral judgment of political life, distinctions must be
elaborated which can account for the existence of free spaces
within the system, even of an opposition. Second, the
identification of the GDR as a Stalinist regime errs in the other
direction as well by hardening the boundary between Stalinism
and communism, making it all too easy for sentimentalists to
separate the latter's Utopian core from the deformations of the
former. The way communism's premodern, nineteenth-cen-
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There are symmetries between 1945 and 1989: the collapse of a system of political domination, including social
relations, norms and ideals; the elimination of its political
structures and mechanisms; the beginning of a restorative
period in which the citizens are relieved of their own sense
of responsibility. Yet to trace such analogies feeds what I see
increasingly as an historically mediated German readiness to
blame someone else (the Other) for political deficits. In this
instance I find differences more essential than analogies, and
not because stressing the continuity between two totalitarian
systems throws into question the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Much of the discussion about Stalinism in the GDR,
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however, does come close to a late vindication of the recent
Historikerdebatte by equating the victims of Nazism and
Stalinism. In particular, for West Germans the process of
seriously assessing GDR history opens up problems of the
past and remembering at a point when it finally seemed as if
postwar economic success and political stability had created
the necessary distance to the mistakes and crimes of the Third
Reich. For them, this repressed history had finally entered the
safety of the museum, and its problematic aspects had shifted
into the sphere of culture (treated ad nauseum in novels,
films, exhibitions, etc.).
During the fifties and sixties in the GDR, on the contrary,
the memory of the Third Reich and the antifascist struggle
remained in the public sphere, and not only as an instrument
for legitimating political hegemony. The experience of defeat
proceeded precisely through antifascist ideology; loss was
transformed into a new identity structure by means of the
symbolic behavior of substitution. With growing historical
distance and the inevitable shift in generations, this framework became increasingly ritualized.
Confronted by the official image of fascism as the absolute
evil, the SS as inhuman beasts, and West Germany as the
historical heir of National Socialism, the younger generation
could choose between only two possible reactions to the Nazi
past: concern or disregard. The former led directly to the State
sanctioned, legendary version of the past; the latter led to a
vacuum (which since has been occupied by neo-fascist
gangs). In other words, in the GDR, identification with the
antifascist past blocked a critical perspective in and on the
GDR itself. Antifascism became a moralistic excuse for the
deficits of the present and for justifying the Cold War logic of
ideological enemies.
If in the former G D R "Stalinism" has converted the issue of
responsibility into an abstraction by shifting attention away
from the individuals who exercised it and the mentality that
tolerated it; in the West the Stasi has become a fetish that
implicates every G D R citizen in a web of culpability. This is
not to say that there has been no interest in the secret police
in the new Federal States. O n the contrary, during the past
eighteen months a veritable avalanche of confessions, memoirs, interviews, and documentations of Stasi victims and
employees has appeared, not only, but primarily in presses
and films from the former GDR. The Stasi's power as the
instrument of the State's bureaucratic terror is slowly being
revealed as the systematic functionalization of personal and
social trust for political ends. Although in the East these
disclosures have elicited spontaneous expressions of disbelief, anger, and vengeance at the scope of surveillance, in fact,
the large majority of former GDR citizens who had no direct
contact with the Stasi seem to consider its deeds to have been
simply one more instance of the dependency relations that
permeated their daily existence. In families (tight housing
forced adult children to live with parents much longer than
in the West), in marriages (the necessity of two incomes to
sustain a minimum standard of living created financial
dependencies between partners that had nothing to do with
emotional attachments), in schools (independent thinking
was virtually blocked in the educational sphere), and in the
market place (goods and services were acquired through a
complicated network of informal connections and favors),
personal loyalties and institutional pressures defined the
limits of social equality. A n d in this system these limits
became more and more arbitrary, distorted by privilege and
access.
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The GDR has been described as a Nischengesellschaft, a
kind of paternalistic social contract in which the State
maintained its power monopoly by promising efficient management in the socio-economic sphere, while the citizens
protected their individual autonomy in apparently unpolitical
free spaces made possible by a rising standard of living
(family, home, hobbies, vacation, etc.). This mutual arrangement was not only a survival strategy but also the basis for
constituting a GDR identity, at least as long as the State could
make good on its promise. As social and economic differentiation grew during the eighties, new forms of passive and
active resistance led to the dissolution of the "contract" and
ultimately to the end of the GDR. Not unlike the typical
middle class West German citizen, the GDR citizen's selfimage was apolitical and to a large extent defined by the
family rather than within any larger political or social
collective. Self-identity derived from the capacity to adjust to
(ugly) realities, so that conformity came to be regarded as a
talent rather than a liability. The Ministry for State Security was
crucial in guaranteeing the state monopoly on power as well
as the apolitical character of individual autonomy. No wonder, then, that many GDR citizens did not and still do not
perceive the Stasi as a constant threat or terror apparatus,
while for many West Germans it has taken on the aura of a
cancer that invaded the entire body politic. The virtue of
conformity has been redefined suddenly as complicity in a
criminal system.
These generalizations, of course, do justice to the spectrum of responses in neither East nor West, but they are
especially characteristic for the public recriminations directed
toward intellectuals and artists from the GDR.
At first this seems surprising to an outsider like myself, who
appreciated any space that could be claimed by critical,
oppositional, or dissident intellectuals. In retrospect, however, it is easy to see how these reformers came to be
identified with Stalinism. As "socialism" came to mean no
more than the failure of the old regime, those who had
enjoyed its privileges and, even more so, those who still
sought to reform it from the inside before "revolution" was
even on the agenda, were suddenly contaminated by the
corruption and implosion of that moribund past. Hence,
Christa Wolf as state poet in the view of some Western critics.
This is right, but it does not go very far. Moreover, it seems
to reveal typically Western, market-place expectations (and
disappointments) about artists who are supposed to function
as metaphors for social relations, validating the possibility of
extreme modes of existence. The relationship between
intellectuals/artists and the "people" in the GDR, however,
was anticipated by Stalin in the thirties already as a pedagogical one in which the former were to serve the State's need for
stability and to be rewarded accordingly. Yet all totalitarian
states distrust the power of the written and spoken word, and
with good reason. If language provides access to truth, then
it is especially important to maintain the party monopoly on
language; this explains the elaborate systems of control in the
publishing and public spheres. Thus, the parameters of
intellectual life were fundamentally different in the East than
in the West. In the GDR, intellectual and artistic contributions
moved between the poles of loyalty (support of the existing
power structure) and critical loyalty (its reform), whereas
those who dared radical critique were marginalized or
expelled with all the power of the State. The room for
oppositional heroes within the GDR was practically nonexistent (cf. Havemann), while those who became oppositional
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heroes through expulsion lost their public. Survival strategies
were schizophrenic: private reservations and public pronouncements; critical rationality and prudent accommodation; Utopian insight and intentional blindness. Indeed, talent
in the G D R could be measured in direct relation to the distance
between the terms of contradiction that an individual could
abide...and express.
Two controversies this past fall that have gained much
public exposure indicate the new parameters being traced for
artists and intellectuals. While many perceived the GDR
intelligentsia as tolerated but powerful court jesters in a semifeudal state, in the post-GDR they are just jesters. Wolf
Biermann's spectacular accusation about Sascha Anderson's
longterm collaboration with the Stasi in his
Büchner-Preis
speech and the background details provided by Jürgen Fuchs
in a Spiegel series have fueled suspicions that the entire artistic
scene was Stasi-controlled and manipulated. Anderson had
been identified with dissident writers and artists since the early
seventies in Leipzig and in the eighties he became a leading
figure in East Berlin's Prenzlauer Berg circle of young,
explicitly nonpolitical dropouts from official G D R culture. If
he was a Stasi mole, even after having left the GDR for West
Berlin in the mid-eighties, then everyone else, including those
who were victimized by the Stasi, appears suddenly as
hopelessly gullible dupes or as potential Stasi collaborators.
Perhaps the Stasi itself organized the opposition against the
state! Furthermore, the complete decimation {Abwicklung) of
all G D R cultural institutions gains a moralistic, denunciatory
legitimacy: they were all infected by the Stasi cancer in any
case.

analysis of the larger issues of continuity and responsibility
for the past is blocked.
A widespread reaction among many of my acquaintances
in East Berlin is resignation and melancholy: from their view
an atmosphere charged with retribution and self-righteous
distrust is not conducive to open, analytical discussion. I see
this attitude as potentially the most serious block to finding
a creative, productive approach to the past (and the present)
because it offers its own kind of defiant pleasure for those
who are constantly reminded of being the "losers." Undoubtedly melancholy is their defense against the experience of
loss, complicated in this instance by the fact that the very
structures and institutions for reflecting on values, identity,
and traditions have themselves disintegrated. What seems
like a quixotic effort by Heiner Müller to prolong the life of
the Akademie der Künste (Ost) over which he presides is,
then, neither an act of nostalgia nor a refusal to let go of the
past. It is rather precisely the desperate attempt to sustain a
public discussion between the past and the future, a bid for
dialogue with an unsympathetic partner. Meanwhile, this
partner—the West German public in the largest s e n s e defines the terms of the discussion: denunciation of GDR
institutions and intellectuals, criminalization of "metaphysical" crimes such as believing in a socialist Utopia, exclusion
of the guilty, and, least offensively, pure disinterest. That the
unification process might implicate the West Germans' selfdefinition as well, demanding of them an examination of
past political behavior and values (I think, for example, of
the anti-communist hysteria of the fifties, the Berufsverbote
of the seventies or the smug conviction in the strength of
their democracy) remains a moot point.

The removal by the Berlin Senate of Heinrich Fink from his
position of democratically elected Rector of the Humboldt
University, owing to suspicion of Stasi collaboration as
documented by the Gauck Commission, illustrates another
side of the equation. Professor of theology and longtime
director of the Theology Department, Fink admitted his
regular meetings with security police in his capacity as high
level administrator in a state institution, but he has disputed
accusations of having been a Stasi official. More importantly,
Fink emerged in the past two years as an effective leader in
the democratic reform movement of the University, stressing
and protecting the internal efforts to transform the institution,
rather than simply importing models and staff from West
Germany, as has been the case in almost all institutions of
higher education. Fink's summary dismissal without due
process raises a number of questions ranging from the degree
of institutional autonomy the government allows to the power
invested in the Gauck Commission in its role of determining
and interpreting the import of Stasi documents. I find the topic
of personal culpability less interesting, however, than the
symptomatic reactions on the part of the students and faculty.
The spontaneous expression of solidarity with Fink through
a student strike and a protest meeting of prominent intellectuals at the Humboldt University represents one of the first
occasions since the unification process began in which those
involved have articulated their own demands based on their
own experience. At the same time, the emotional solidarity
has become so closely identified with the person Fink that an
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My comments are intended to suggest how the process of
forgetting is shaping the memory of the GDR. Re-collection
means creating categories and defining hierarchies of importance anew after a disruption. I interpret the anxieties that
have surfaced during the transition as a good sign; they are
an appropriate affect of loss and disorientation. The problem
I foresee is that the partner in this process, the empathetic
witness who helps constitute the public context of response
to the rupture, refuses to participate in a fruitful way. At this
point, then, I am especially concerned that the revolutionary
events from September 1989 to March 1990 may be smothered by a legalistic or moralistic discussion of Stalinism and
the Stasi. Too frequently I hear the dismissive comment that
a relatively small number of people toppled the SED, that
Gorbachev and Kohl were the main agents of change or that
the revolutionary goals were coopted by greed and electioneering. As a result, the unique emotional experience of
participating in revolutionary change is being displaced by
a kind of ideologically defined patience or passivity. Yet, if
historical memory plays any role in determining future
political decisions, then precisely the emancipatory movements of the past are a crucial component of that memory,
especially for the Germans, who lack a strong tradition in this
respect.
(January 1992)
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